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Illusory Figures and Illusory Contours
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and IT, have very large receptive fields and often are
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Toward an Understandingthe shapes and figures in the scene. These hypotheses
or contextual information then propagate down the vi- of the Brain Substrates
sual hierarchy to guide the early visual areas to work of Reward in Humans
out the details, constructing a precise representation of
illusory contour using the intrinsic circuitry in V1 and V2.
As the illusory contour becomes clear and precise in
the early visual cortex, the global shape percept of the
illusory figure starts to emerge in the higher visual areas. “If you ever get close to a human and human emotion,
From this perspective, the computation of illusory con- you better get ready to get confused.”
tour involves both the early and the late processes. —Bjork
A network of brain regions has been implicated inTai Sing Lee
food-reward processing. O’Doherty et al. (2002) nowComputer Science Department
provide evidence that this network is differentiallyCenter for the Neural Basis of Cognition
Rm 115, Mellon Institute modulated by anticipation versus receipt of a food
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reward and suggest an additional effect of valence of vated in a hungry, compared to satiated, state (Tataranni
et al., 1999). A comment made by the anatomists Carmi-the stimulus.
chael and Price (1996) is telling: “The higher-order pro-
cessing of olfactory, gustatory, and visceral informationOne approach to studying human emotion has been to
may provide the sort of hedonic representation that un-begin with the so-called basic emotions and study the
derlies much of what is meant by the term ‘reward,’neural substrates of each. The results from studies fol-
especially as applied in behavioral studies of monkeys.”lowing this approach suggest that certain brain struc-
Nevertheless, studies of reward processing in humanstures play a relatively greater role in one emotion com-
have generally favored investigation of “higher-order”pared to another. The role of the amygdala in fear and
rewards such as gambling, video game playing, andthe insula and caudate nucleus in disgust are two of the
drug addiction. As a result, direct comparisons withbest examples (see Calder et al., 2001, for an excellent
neurophysiolgical data and, thus, the dominant theoriesreview). A second approach has been to extract funda-
of reward processing are problematic. In this issue ofmental components common to all emotion and devise
Neuron, O’Doherty and colleagues (2002) report the firstexperiments to target these “fundamentals.” Although
study of food-reward learning in humans.there is likely to be disagreement over the menu of fun-
Event-related fMRI was used to investigate whetherdamentals, candidates include valence (e.g., approach
different brain regions are engaged during anticipationversus avoidance), expectation versus receipt of re-
versus receipt of a moderately pleasant and moderatelyward, degree of arousal, and interaction with internal
aversive taste. Anticipation was created via classicalstate. In this issue of Neuron, a study by O’Doherty
conditioning whereby each of three arbitrary visual stim-and colleagues (2002) suggests that we must take this
uli was reliably paired with one of the three taste solu-process one step further to consider interaction among
tions (pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral). Presentationfundamentals.
of one of the visual (conditioned) stimuli, which wouldWhere to Start?
reliably predict the delivery of one of the solutions,It seems hardly possible that a few primary reinforcers
started each trial. A variable delay followed (between 4and even fewer drives come to imbue our lives with mean-
and 11 s), and then the relevant taste was delivered.ing. Yet this is just what happens. One need only con-
Perception of the conditioned stimulus was taken tosider the power of the drive to obtain a drug in an addict
signify the presence of anticipation of one of the tastes.to appreciate the profound effect a single drive can have
The results indicate that when an abstract neutralupon behavior, value systems, and the meaning of life.
visual stimulus acquires value via association with aThe most fundamental step in understanding effect and
primary reward, experiencing that stimulus results inhuman emotion must therefore begin, as the behavior-
different brain activity, compared to experiencing theists foresaw, with simple conditioning—learning how
primary reward. They suggest that this reflects a funda-objects, events, thoughts, and actions acquire meaning
mental difference between expectation engendered byvia their association with a primary reward or drive.
the secondary reward and receipt of the primary reward.Primary Reinforcers Are Primary
Anticipation versus Receipt of a Primary
If we want to understand how objects, events, thoughts,
Reward: Timing Is Everything
and actions acquire meaning, we must start with learn-
Different brain regions were recruited during anticipa-
ing about how natural primary rewards are represented
tion, compared to receipt of taste, and this was often
in the brain. While the study of intracranial self-stimula- dependent upon valence. As predicted, the insula/fron-
tion and addictive agents has proven extremely useful tal operculum, which is thought to represent a primary
in the laboratory, “reward” evolved to facilitate natural gustatory region, was activated by the receipt of taste.
behaviors such as feeding and sex, as opposed to drug However, the anterior orbitofrontal cortex was the only
addiction or intracranial self-stimulation. This distinction region where receipt produced significantly greater acti-
may have important neurophysiological ramifications. It vation than anticipation, and this region is too anterior to
makes good sense, therefore, to begin to build a theory correspond to the secondary taste region. Interestingly,
of human emotion by starting with uncovering the brain activity in this region habituated to receipt of the pleas-
representation of food reward. Much is understood ant, but not the unpleasant, taste.
about food reward in animals, and many theories of The dopaminergic midbrain, amygdala, and ventral
reward learning incorporate knowledge gleaned from striatum were all preferentially engaged by anticipation,
these studies. Less attention has been paid to the study compared to receipt, of a pleasant taste. This was not
of the brain substrates of food reward in humans. In true for the same comparison with the aversive taste,
fact, we have only recently begun to understand the and a direct comparison of the anticipation of the pleas-
cortical representations of taste and smell. ant compared to aversive tastes showed that the mid-
As it turns out, the neural substrates of the sensory brain and amygdalar peaks were significantly more acti-
perception of food overlap significantly with the brain vated by anticipation of the pleasant taste. The results
representation of reward. Tastes, smells, foods, and fla- provide strong evidence that the dopaminergic midbrain
vors all consistently activate overlapping regions of the and regions to which it projects respond to the anticipa-
insula, anterior cingulate cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, tion of a moderately pleasant taste, but not to its receipt.
and anteromedial temporal lobe, including the amyg- Food is a complex stimulus that leads to stimulation of
dala, and these same regions appear to be sensitive to multiple sensory systems, including taste, smell, texture,
the reward value of chemosensory stimuli (Zald and temperature, and sometimes the trigeminal system. Uni-
Pardo, 1997; Zald et al., 1998; O’Doherty et al., 2000, modal taste stimulation with concentrated saline or bit-
ter solutions may be rated as very unpleasant (e.g., Zald2002; Small et al., 2001). They are also the regions acti-
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et al., 1998); however, sweet solutions are rarely rated et al., 2001). However, further investigation is clearly
as highly pleasant. Activity in the dopaminergic midbrain needed to confirm this possibility.
has never been reported in any neuroimaging study of Internal State, Timing, and Valence
unimodal taste or bimodal taste/smell stimulation. It May Interact
could be argued that simple tastes such as the sugar The idea that the amygdala responds preferentially to
water used by O’Doherty and colleagues was not re- anticipation, compared to consummation, contrasts
warding enough to activate dopaminergic reward cir- with previous studies implicating the amygdala in the
cuits in the midbrain. However, a recent study by Small experience of pleasant and aversive tastes (Zald et al.,
and colleagues (2001) suggests that mesolimbic reward 1998), aversive smell (Zald and Pardo, 1997), and aver-
circuits are also not activated by consummation of a sive novel flavors (Small et al., 1997). However, no at-
highly rewarding food. We used positron emission to- tempt was made to isolate expectation from experience
mography (PET) to scan chocolate lovers as they ate in these studies. For example, Small and colleagues
chocolate to beyond satiety. Eating chocolate when it (1997) delivered taste/smell pairs to subjects for 8 s,
was rated as highly pleasurable did not lead to activation removed that pair, and then delivered a subsequent pair.
of the midbrain, compared to the more neutral condition Zald et al. (1998) instructed subjects to “see if you can
of tasting water. However, activity in the dopaminergic taste anything.” Thus, neural activation almost certainly
midbrain decreased linearly with decreases in pleasant- resulted from a combination of expectation and experi-
ness ratings. In light of O’Doherty’s findings, it is possi- ence. This was less likely the case in the chocolate study
ble that this relationship corresponded to decreased in which subjects experienced only the chocolate in
anticipation of eating chocolate instead of decreased each scan and knew what to expect since all scans
pleasantness ratings per se. No relationship was ob- were identical. However, the tendency for amygdalar
served between pleasantness ratings and amygdalar responses to habituate rapidly may account for the fail-
responses. ure to observe amygdala activity in that study (Breiter
A role for the amygdala in representing the anticipa- et al., 1997).
tion of taste reward is consistent with the findings of Finally, it is also possible that the experience of in-
LaBar and colleagues (2001) who report amygdala acti- creased negative saliency is associated with increased
vation when subjects viewed pictures of food items, anticipation of potential ill effects, whereas intensely
compared to pictures of tools, when hungry, but not pleasurable experiences are less likely to be accompa-
when full. This study raises the important point that nied by an anticipatory component. In this case, the
anticipatory responses to food reward by the amygdala failure of tasting saline to activate the amygdala may
are dependent upon modulation of reward value by in- indeed be attributable to the fact that it was not particu-
ternal state. Decreases in amygdalar activity have been larly aversive and, thus, not likely to be accompanied
reported during the experience of craving (Breiter et al., by negative anticipation. The idea that experience and
1997). However, differential activity in the amygdala has anticipation may co-occur in a valence-dependent man-
not been observed in hungry, compared to full, states, ner may help to account for the greater tendency to
although this region receives direct connections from observe amygdalar activity in relation to aversive stimu-
the insula, which is involved in the representation of lation. It can also be used to explain amygdalar activa-
hunger. Tataranni et al. (1999) used PET to measure tion in response to fearful, but not disgusting, facial
rCBF differences in states of hunger compared to sati- expressions. Fearful facial expressions signify im-
ety. The insula was significantly more active in the hun- pending danger and seem much more likely to be ac-
gry state, and activity here correlated with plasma insulin companied by negative anticipation (“fear”) than per-
levels. In accordance with this finding, Small and col- ception of disgusting faces.
leagues report a significant positive relationship be- Conclusions
tween motivation to eat chocolate and rCBF in the in-
It is clear that brain recruitment during food-reward pro-
sula. In contrast, O’Doherty and colleagues (2000) report
cessing is contingent upon a complex interaction be-
sensory-specific satiety effects in the insula in only one
tween valence, anticipation/receipt, and internal state.of six subjects, suggesting that the insula is not as sensi-
It will be important for these factors to be incorporatedtive to sensory-related changes in reward value of food.
into paradigms to tease apart their interaction. One ave-Internal State and Food Reward
nue for future research will be to capitalize on new meth-Food reward may change by two different mechanisms.
odology that allows dopaminergic function during food-Alliesthesia refers to changes in the reward value of
reward processing to be assayed in humans. Anotherfood related to internal state (Cabanac, 1979), whereas
will be to directly compare brain activation during receiptsensory-specific satiety refers to the changes in reward
of natural and artificial primary rewards. Finally, while itvalue that are specific to the food eaten. Sensory-spe-
is reasonable to assume that innate rewards such ascific satiety is based upon the observation that the re-
food are represented similarly in the human and nonhu-ward value of the food eaten to satiety decreases to a
man animal brain, there is no question that in humansgreater extent, compared to other foods (O’Doherty et
abstract rewards are tremendously more elaborate andal., 2000). The fact that these two forms of food-reward
powerful. Thus, we design beautiful cathedrals, forgomodulation are psychologically dissociable suggests
sleep and food to meet grant deadlines, organize thethat their underlying neural substrates may also differ.
Olympics, and flock to Las Vegas. This suggests that thePreliminary evidence indicates that sensory-specific sa-
associative processes by which abstract stimuli acquiretiety may rely upon mechanisms in the orbitofrontal cor-
and express meaning must be a major point of diver-tex (O’Doherty et al., 2000), whereas the insular cortex
may have a relatively greater role in alliesthesia (Small gence in humans and animals.
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